My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 55 and 56. I received a satisfactory reply on the four amendments from the previous group, which I submitted to the Government and the Minister. I also submitted Amendments 55 and 56, but I did not quite get such a full support for them, so I think it is worth explaining to the House what they are—plus a slight history lesson.
The Minister’s statement in the debate on 16 December 2024 set down the clear intent that the regulator should have primacy ahead of all competition organisers:
“I want also to stress that the regulator will not stop the leagues imposing their own competition rules so long as they do not conflict with the regulator’s regime”.
—[Official Report, 16/12/24; col. 40.]
The then Government’s consultation response document noted:
“The Regulator will set the legal baseline for regulation in areas within its remit. There may be scope for industry bodies to layer on top, but the Regulator would coordinate with these bodies to ensure that any additional rules were supportive of the regulatory approach and objectives. This means that industry bodies will need to be receptive to working with the Regulator to potentially streamline and adapt their existing rules, to allow for a coherent regulatory landscape that minimises burdens on clubs”.
However, this is not reflected in Clause 55(6), which requires only that the competition organisers “consult” with the regulator. That is not what was previously said.
Through discussions on the Bill, we have seen that the level of co-operation of competition organisers has varied, so it is not satisfactory to rely on their good will to resolve regulatory conflicts. Indeed, recent Premier League consultations have resulted in a legal spat with the Professional Footballers’ Association, the EFL, the Government and FIFA, and various disputes with the Premier League executive. The proposed amendments aim to ensure that the regulatory system is clear and coherent and avoids the confusing overregulation of rules. The IFR can act as an important safeguard.
We have seen a number of recent legal cases that have demonstrated deep flaws in some of the competition organisers’ approach. For example, the Premier League lost a case to Leicester City, where Leicester was held to be a member of neither the Premier League nor the EFL, due to poor and contradictory drafting of Premier League rules. That was a report from the Appeal Board.
Of even greater concern, the Premier League rules on associated party transactions were found to have been illegally introduced to advantage one set of clubs over another, and to have abused a dominant market position. As a result, three years of those rules were held to be void, as though they never existed, and there are more damages claims to come. These rules came about because of rushed processes. The panel noted that they had not been subject to proper analysis or examination before introduction:
“There does not appear to have been any discussion or analysis as to how such an exclusion would affect the effectiveness of the PSR, and the principle of sustainability of club finance which underlies the PSR”— the profit and sustainability rules in competitions. That was from a judgment in favour of Manchester City, which additionally found that:
“Nor was there any evidence that the PL had in fact carried out any analysis as to the impact of the shareholder exclusion on different clubs and to seek to justify such an exclusion”.
Many of these difficulties have come about because of the inherent conflict in the regulated entities—the clubs—being the ones that set the rules. Clearly, the independent regulator will be able to act on that. It will act effectively to regulate the financial sustainability of English football and undermine its entitlement.
The proposed amendment is targeted at financial and business regulations; it leaves sporting regulations completely untouched. It is of no benefit to anyone in the game for there to be rushed, ill thought-through or illegal market regulations, from whatever source. It will benefit all to ensure that the IFR can act with quality checks on future attempts by competition organisers when they attempt economic market regulation. The Premier League has clearly demonstrated that it is not good at economic market regulation; in doing so, it has ended up costing the Premier League and its constituent clubs tens of millions of pounds in legal fees and dislocated activities.